Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Olaf Theodore Stevensen, Jr. and Barbara Ann
Stevensen v. World of Fitness, Inc. and D. Leonard
Rice : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Hardin A. Whitney; Wayne G. Petty; Moyle and Draper; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Nikols; F. Alan Fletcher; Parsons, Behle, and Latimer; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent DAB
Associates.
James A. Arrowsmith; Watkins and Faber; Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stevensen v. Nikols, No. 14006.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1132

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
(,•

STATE

OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR.
and BARBARA ANN STEVENS!"'•:

r,'-H

^

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
)

Case No. 14006

vs.
)

NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES,
a partnership, GEORGE ANAG)
NOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREINHOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES,
)
Defendants-Respondents.

)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, JUDGE.

JAMES A. ARROWSMITH
Watkins & Faber
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellanl
HARDIN A. WHITNEY
WAYNE G. PETTY
Moyle & Draper
600 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Nikols
F. ALAN FLETCHER
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
79 South State StreetSalt Lake City, Utah b « ; U
Attorney for DefendantRespondent DAB Associates

ILE
JUN2 61975
Cferk, Supremo Court, WaJj

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I. WHEN THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY
FOUND THAT APPELLANTS HAD NOT BREACHED
THE NIKOLS SUBLEASE, IT WAS IMPROPER
FOR THE COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES
TO RESPONDENTS

9

POINT II. WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS CONCLUSIVE
THAT RESPONDENTS DAB HAD CHANGED THE
OPERATION OF THE RESTAURANT, THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT RESPONDENTS HAD BREACHED THE
LEASE

11

POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
$613.01 TO RESPONDENTS FOR CHARGES
MADE BY MEMBERS OF THE SALT LAKE
ATHLETIC CLUB

19

CONCLUSION

20
Authorities Cited

Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Ut. 2d 377,
325 P.2d 906 (1958)

10

Fulford v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City
of Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 A.2d 580 (1951) 17,18
Leograndis v. Liquor Control Comm., 149 Conn.
507, 182 A.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1962)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16,17

Statutes Cited
Salt Lake City Ordinances
Section 19-1-11 (1974)
Section 19-3-9 (1974)
Section 20-14-1 (1974)
Salt Lake City Zoning Ordinance
Section 51-2-42A (1972)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR.
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 14006

NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES,
a partnership, GEORGE ANAGNOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREINHOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES,
Defendants-Respondents.

]

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellants leased the dining room and kitchen
facilities of the Salt Lake Athletic Club and Spa (formerly
the Towne House) to Respondent Nick N. Nikols (hereinafter
Nikols), who subleased the premises to Respondents DAB
Associates, Anagnostakis (Aggie), Breinholt and Daines
(hereinafter DAB or Aggie).

Because of certain defaults

under the lease, Appellants brought an unlawful detainer
action.

Respondents counterclaimed for breach of the

covenant of quiet possession.

DAB also sought reimbursement

for charges by members of Appellants1 club.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-2DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The district court, the Honorable Peter F. Leary
presiding, dismissed Appellant's Complaint and Respondents1
Counterclaims, but awarded attorneys' fees to Respondents.
The court also awarded DAB $613.01 for charges by Appellants' members. '"•'^•--^

-•'•'-'? v-^^/^s- zo- t.:.^ .v--u,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's
decision as to dismissal of their complaint, award of
attorneys' fees to Respondents and award of $613.01 to DAB.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

a :: :

The statement of facts has been divided into
numbered paragraphs for more convenient reference.
1.

Appellants own and operate the Salt Lake

Athletic Club. (R. 83).
2.

The Athletic Club had approximately 1500

members, with approximately 250 family memberships and
approximately 100 memberships issued to minors (R. 84), and
the dining room facilities were available to them. (Paragraph 8 of House Rules, Exhibit 19-P).
3.

During the ten years when Appellants oper-

ated the dining room, they had a complete salad bar with
twenty or more different items, and four to eight entrees
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-3every day for lunch and at least six to eight entrees and
the salad bar in the evening.
4.

(R. 92).

Appellants leased the Towne House Restaurant

facilities to Nikols on or about December 1, 1971 (R. 242)
for preparing and serving such food and beverages to club
members as Appellants had previously supplied (R. 245).
The lease provided that in the event there was not sufficient
food and beverage business from Club members, Nikols was
permitted to open the premises to the public.
5.

(R. 247-48).

Paragraph 5 of the Sublease between Appellants

and Respondent Nikols provided that Nikols would have
available and prepare and serve to Club members food and
beverages in the types and qualities being served by
Appellants and at the following times:
Lunch

Monday through Friday
11:30 a.m. to 2:30 a.m.

Dinner

Saturday
7:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

Nikols was required to have sandwiches and drinks available
Monday through Saturday from 6:00p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
(R. 246).
6.

Nikols admitted that Appellants sought him

because he was a master chef and because of his reputation
as a good restauranteur (R. 180), and that he went into the
Towne House to provide great and excellent quality of food
and variety.

(R. 181).

*
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-47.

Nikols did not change the format when he took

over (R. 92) . He testified he had six or eight or more
different entrees (R. 173, 174), and that he maintained the
revolving salad bar, which had a great variety of salads,
all during the period he ran the restaurant. (R. 180).
8.

Nikols opened the premises to the public in

the spring of 1973 (R. 164), but tried to give the best
menu items possible to bring in the customers. (R. 174).
When Nikols opened to the public, he advertised the excellent cuisine. (R. 172).
9.

There was no cover charge while the rest-

aurant was private. (R. 167). After the restaurant was
opened to the public, on most Fridays and Saturdays when
Nikols had a local band, he did not charge a cover charge.
(R. 178). Most of the time there was no cover charge on
weeknights. (R. 175).
10.

On or about January 7, 1974, Nikols sub-

leased the restaurant to DAB (R. 254), who operate

Aggie's

Club and Restaurant on the premises. (R. 9).
11.

Nikols testified that Aggie was required to

maintain excellent food and service. (R. 184).
12.

Nikols testified that Aggie worked as a

manager, but did not have any knowledge as a restauranteur.
(R. 183) .

•
13.

•^•-••,.

y. ........ ...;.....:..

In his operation, Aggie charges a $5.00

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5door charge or "package", (R. 17). The package includes
the patrons' cover charge, floor show, dancing, all the
patrons' beer, and all their drink mix. (R. 20, 220).
14.

Under Aggie's operation, on Wednesday

evenings, the only food available was a roast beef dinner
for $1.00 in addition to the $5.00 door charge.

On Thursday

evenings, only a spaghetti dinner was available for $1.00
in addition to the $5.00 door charge. (R. 17-18, 222).
15.

Aggie discontinued the salad bar on July

15, 1974. (R. 221).
16.

Aggie operates under a Class "C" Beer

License, (Exhibit 12-P), and does not allow minors on the
premises. (R. 33). Aggie also has a cabaret license.
(R. 33) (Exhibit 10-P).
17.

For the period August 1, 1974 through

November 12, 1974, Aggie's package sales exceeded total
food sales by more than four times.

Package sales exceeded

dinner sales by eight times. On a number of Tuesday
evenings when Aggie's was open, there were no dinner
sales, but there were hundreds of dollars in package
sales. (Exhibit 7-P).
18.

The figures shown for package sales in

Exhibit 7-P do not include food, except for Wednesday and
Thursday nights, when for an additional $1.00 a roast beef
dinner or a spaghetti dinner was available. (R 20-21).
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-6Aggie testified that on Wednesdays and Thursdays, a lot
of his customers don't eat.
19.

(R. 17).

Mr. Rinehart Peshell testified that on

October 29, 1974 (a Tuesday evening) he arrived at Aggie's
Club at approximately 10:30 p.m. (R. Ill), that he observed
no one eating (R. 112), and that he only

observed mixers

being brought by girls and drinks brought in by patrons.
(R. 112). Aggie's records show no dinner sales that
evening.

(Exhibit 7-P).
20.

-

Lorraine Heugly testified she visited

Aggie's Club with her husband on October 29, 1974 (R. 138).
They arrived at approximately a quarter to nine.
was no linen or silverware on the table.

There

No one offered

them a menu, and she did not observe anyone eating that
evening. (R. 139) . Neither Mrs. Heugly nor her husband
asked for a menu (R. 141-142).
when she went there.
eat.

She didn't intend to eat

She didn't know it was a place to

She thought it was a club. (R. 142).
21*

Mrs. Heugly also attended Aggie's Club on

October 31, 1974.

She was not given a menu, she observed

no one eating, and to her knowledge none of the tables were
set up with silverware or napkins.

She didn't expect there

would be anything to eat. (R. 142) .
22.

Aggie testified he employed an entertainment

group called "Promises"(R. 25, 37) who put on a floor show
called "Rip Rock and the Stick Shifts", in which they used
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law (R.
Library,44,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU.
the words
"ass",
"shit",
45)
and
"horny"
(R. 48) in
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7their act since August 1, 1974.
23.

Appellant testified that he had witnessed

Aggie's floor show in August and that he had heard one of
Aggie's entertainers state,
fuck you."

"If I have offended anybody,

(R. 94-96).

24.

Mr. Peshell testified that he witnessed

the floor show of Rip Rock and the Stick Shifts on the
night of October 29, 1974. Two of the entertainers carried
on a conversation concerning their sexual prowess, using
some female patrons as an example, one claiming the other
entertainer's organs were small and that he knew the lady's
vagina was large because he had engaged in sex with her.
There was a slide show in which one slide showed a lady
with bared breasts.

The group presented a further routine

of two young men riding in a car, discussing their desire
for intercourse, crabs, itching and their sexual organs.
After drinking beer, one indicated he needed to relieve
himself, and proceeded to act out urinating.
25.

(R. 113-115).

On November 13, 1974, Mr. Peshell again

visited Aggie's Club (R. 115). One of the entertainers
acted as if he opened a can of beer using his sexual organ.
The entertainers also acted out urinating on some of the
patrons.

(R. 118). Aggie was there on both occasions.

(R. 119).
26.

Ken Rasmussen, a member of the Towne House

Athletic Club, testified that his children used to visit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8the restaurant first when Appellant and then when Nikols
ran the restaurant, but they ceased when Aggie took over.
(R. 106-107).

He would no longer let them go because of

the type of operation. (R. 107).
27.

David R. Davidson, Jr., a member of the

Towne House, testified he had two minor daughters who
patronized the restaurant prior to the time it became
Aggie's when Appellants and Nikols operated it, and that
they have not gone to it since it became Aggie's Club and
Restaurant because a sign says "No Minors Allowed". (R. 108
109).
28.

Aggie had charges of approximately $613.01

from Towne House members. (R. 198-199).
20.

Aggie testified that Appellant never asked

him to carry any charges for him (R. 198, 201) and that
Appellants refused to back up charges by members so that
Aggie's would extend them credit. (R. 211).
30.

Appellant's bookkeeper received Aggie's

bill for charges and went over it with him. (R. 201).
There was no evidence she agreed the bill was owed or
had authority to so agree.
31.

Aggie testified he assumed Appellant would

pay the charges when he sent him the statement. (R. 200).
32.

Paragraph 16 of the Sublease dated December

1, 1971 between Appellants and Respondent Nikols, provides
in p a r t :

••-• -;™-..-.
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_

-9Sublessor and Sublessee agree that if
either defaults in any of the conditions
and terms of this lease, the defaulting
party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including attorney fees, which may
arise or accrue from enforcing this
lease or in obtaining possession of the
premises or in pursuing any remedy provided by the laws of the State of Utah
whether by filing suit or otherwise.
(R. 251).

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

WHEN THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND
THAT APPELLANTS HAD NOT BREACHED THE
NIKOLS SUBLEASE, IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE
COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES TO
RESPONDENTS.
Nikols counterclaimed against Appellants for
breach of the covenant of quiet possession in Paragraph 11
of the Sublease between Appellants and Nikols, and claimed
attorneys' fees.

The court's award of attorneys' fees

was clearly improper.

The Sublease between Nikols and the

Appellants provides that in the event of default, the
defaulting party would pay attorneys' fees.
other provision for attorneys' fees.

There is no

The court specifically

determined that Nikols had no cause of action against
Appellants.

In spite of the fact that the court dismissed

all counts of Nikols' claims as to alleged breach of the
Sublease by Appellants (R. 348), the court awarded Nikols
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
attorneys' fees in the amount of $3,665.63.

Because the

I

court dismissed Nikols' claims, there was no basis on
which to award attorneys' fees.

I

The court again erred in awarding attorneys1

|

fees to DAB, who had counterclaimed against Appellants
for breach of the covenant of quiet possession contained

I

in the Sublease Agreement between DAB and Nikols, and

but awarded DAB attorneys' fees in the amount of $3,175.00.

I
I

Because the court dismissed DAB's counterclaim no attorneys'

]

sought general damages in the amount of $4,500.

The

court dismissed DAB's claim, no cause of action, (R. 348),

fees should have been awarded.

Such award would be

improper under both the Stevensen-Nikols Sublease and
the Nikols-DAB Sublease Agreement.

re

;

i

In addition, the award of attorneys' fees to
DAB was improper for another reason.

Paragraph 16 of the

Sublease Agreement between Nikols and DAB, under which
the court awarded attorneys' fees to DAB, is binding only
upon Nikols and DAB.
to that agreement.

Appellants were not ever parties

Respondent Nikols could not bind -v •,••"..

Appellants to an agreement to pay attorneys' fees to his
sublessees.
^e

: This court has frequently stated that attorneys'

fees are not recoverable unless provided for by the contract
or authorized by statute.

See Pacific

Coast Title Insurance

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-11Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.f 7 Ut. 2d 377,
325 P.2d 906 (1958).

In the instant case, we have neither.

Because Nikols was not entitled to be awarded attorneys'
fees under his Agreement with Appellants, and because DAB
had no agreement with Appellants, the trial court was absolutely wrong in awarding attorneys' fees to Respondents.
POINT II
WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS CONCLUSIVE THAT
RESPONDENTS DAB HAD CHANGED THE OPERATION OF THE RESTAURANT, THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD HAVE FOUND AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT RESPONDENTS HAD BREACHED THE LEASE.
Under paragraph 4 of the Sublease with Appellants,
Nikols assumed the operation of preparing and serving such
food and beverages as Appellants had previously supplied
to members of the Club in the main dining room and kitchen
area.

Nikols was required to have available and serve

to Club members food and beverages in the types and
qualities then served by Appellants and to serve lunch
Monday through Friday, 11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., dinner on
Saturday from 7:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., and to have sandwiches and drinks available Monday through Saturday from
6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.

Nikols could offer additional

service if he so determined.

In the event there was not

sufficient business from Club members to make the business
profitable, then under paragraph 9 of the Sublease, Nikols
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12was permitted to open the premises to the public and make
it a public restaurant.
5).

(See Statement of Facts 4 and

,: ; ,:.^fe^

:;u;t..oA:-n?tc ^vt-'^^:-

'.

The evidence was clear and uncontradicted that
during the ten years Appellants operated the dining room
facilities at The Towne House Athletic Club, they had
maintained a revolving salad bar with twenty entrees,
plus a menu with four to eight entrees at lunch and six
to eight entrees for dinner.

Appellants sought out Nikols

because of his reputation as a master chef and fine
restauranteur.

When Nikols subleased the restaurant from

Appellants, he maintained the salad bar and offered six
to eight or more entrees off the menu.

Members took

their minor children to the restaurant.

A cover charge

was imposed only on a few occasions while the restaurant
was private.

When Nikols opened the restaurant to the

public, he advertised the excellent cuisine.

He only

charged a cover charge when there was expensive entertainment.

On weeknights he tried not to charge a cover charge,

and on most weekends he did not.
3, 6 through 9, 26 and 27).

(See Statement of Facts
^

Aggie drastically changed the operation of the
restaurant.

He discontinued the salad bar.

Hq obtained

a Class "C" Beer License and thereafter prohibited minors
from using the restaurant facilities.

He instituted a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13-

package deal of $5.00 per person, which covered entrance,
entertainment and all of each patron's beer and drink mix.
His business records show that the great bulk of his
income came from his package and not from food sales.
For the period of August 1, 1974 through November 12, 1974,
package sales exceeded total food sales by over four
times.

For

that period, package sales exceeded the evening

dinner sales by eight times.

In fact, Aggie's business

records show that on a number of evenings, there were no
food sales at all. Witnesses testified that on the night
of Tuesday, October 29, 1974, they observed no one eating,
no tables were set up, and they were not offered menus.
One witness testified she did not know she could get food
there because she thought it was a club.

Further, Aggie

brought in a group of entertainers whose show included
reference to sexual intercourse, sex organs, urination
and similar material.

(See Statement of Facts 13 through 25).

These facts clearly establish that Aggie's
operation differed substantially from the way in which
Appellants and Respondent Nikols operated the restaurant.
Aggie's operation resembles a bar rather than a restaurant.
Appellants could find no Utah cases where a court
has construed the meaning of "public restaurant".

Most

cases from other jurisdictions involving a judicial interDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14pretation of this term have concerned liquor control,
zoning or civil rights statutes.
Aggiefs operation was not open to the public.
Aggie's obtained a Class "C" Beer License.

Section

19-3-9 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances provides:
Unlawful to Permit Minors in Certain
Establishments. It shall be unlawful
for any licensee of a Class "C", or
Class "D", license for the sale of beerf
or any operator, agent or employee of
such licensee to permit any person
under the age of twenty-one years to
remain in or about such licensed premises.
It is significant that Aggie's chose to obtain and operate
under a Class "C" permit.

The traditional restaurant

beer license, a Class "B" permit, requires that sixty
percent (60%) of the restaurant's revenue be derived from
the sale of food.
Ordinances).

(Section 19-1-11, Salt Lake City

As can be seen from Exhibit 7-P, Aggie's

Club could not meet this requirement.

By obtaining the

Class "C" permit, Aggie excluded all minors as well as all
minor members of The Towne House Club who formerly had
full rights to use the facilities.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "public" as being
"open to all". Where Aggie's operation denied admission
to a significant portion of the public, all minor members
of the Athletic Club, and all minor children of members,
the Court should have found as a matter of law that Aggie
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i
i
i

-15-

was not operating a public restaurant within the terms of
the Sublease.
Moreover, Aggie's Club does not meet any definition of restaurant used by Salt Lake City.

Section

51-2-42A (1972) of the Salt Lake City Zoning Ordinance
provides:
<

RESTAURANT. "Restaurant" shall mean
a building within which there is served
a variety of hot food for consumption
on the premises and where more than
sixty (60%) percent of the gross volume
is derived from the sale of foods
served for consumption on the premises.

For purposes of obtaining a Class "B" Beer License, Section
19-1-11 (1974) of the Salt Lake City Ordinances states
"restaurant"
-;'.£• /"-'"

. . . shall mean premises where a
variety of hot food is served for consumption on the premises and where
more than sixty percent of the gross
volume of business is derived from the
sale of food served for consumption
on the premises.

A very high percentage of Aggie's revenue comes
from his package sales, which includes the cover charge,
beer and mixers.

Less than one-fourth of Aggie's total

revenue comes from food sales. Clearly Aggie's does not
meet the sixty percent requirement of the ordinances.

In

addition, both ordinances require that a variety of hot
food be served.

Aggie's own testimony was that on Wednesdays

and Thursdays only one item was available.
The business license definition of restaurant is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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broad.

Section 20-14-1 (1971) of the Salt Lake City

Ordinances states:
"Restaurant" as used in this chapter
shall be defined to be any place
where food or drink is prepared,
served or offered for sale or sold
for human consumption on or off the
premises.
The obvious intent of the city is to regulate all businesses,
and, therefore, the definition of restaurant must necessarily
be broad enough to cover all establishments where any food
at all is served.

It is therefore more appropriate to

i
i
i
i
i
j
I

refer to other ordinances, such as zoning and liquor control, as well as cases, to determine the ordinary definition
of a restaurant.
In Leograndis v. Liquor Control Commission,
149 Conn. 507, 182 A.2d 9 (Sup. Ct.

Err. 1962), the

i
i
|

liquor control commission had suspended a restaurant
liquor permit, and the lower court had dismissed an appeal
from the suspension.

The plaintiff had liquor sales for

undisclosed periods of $47,989.45 as against food sales
of $2,074.65. The plaintiff admitted he did little or
no noon hour business and very little, if any, supper
business.

Most of his business was done on Friday and

Saturday nights, when he provided a band and floor show.
The defendant relied on Section 30-1(17) of the general
statutes, which defined restaurant as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

-17(17) "Restaurant" means space, in a
suitable and permanent building, kept,
used, maintained, advertised and held
out to the public to be a place where hot
meals are regularly served, . . .
The court, in construing this statute stated:
The mere possession of a supply of food
sufficient to offer a limited number and
variety of meals would not make the
premises a restaurant under Section 30-1(17)
if there were so few food patrons or
their demands for food were so insignificant that the service of hot meals
was not a regular part of the permitee's
business. 182 A.2d at 11.
The court concluded that the commission had
committed no error in arriving at its decision.
Fulford v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of
Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 A.2d 580 (1951) arose from a proceeding before the Board of Zoning Adjustment for permission
to sell beer in a restaurant.

The Board denied permission,

and the petitioners appealed to the circuit court, which
affirmed the Board's action.

The Supreme Court of Alabama

held that the sale of beer in the restaurant would have
been an unauthorized extension of the nonconforming business
under the zoning ordinances.

In its analysis, the court

cited with approval the following language:
"A restaurant is defined by Webster to
be an eating house and such it has always
been construed under the law and not
where intoxicants are dispensed under the
guise of running a restaurant, a restaurant
keeper in contemplation of law is not a
saloon keeper" . . . "A restaurant does
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-18not necessarily mean a beer and wine
restaurant^ and a written lease of
premises for use as a restaurant did
not obligate landlord to assent to
application for a beer and wine license."
(citations omitted)*
Appellant's evidence as to the operation of
Aggie's Club was clear and unrebutted.

Aggie's is not

operated as a public restaurant, as such term has been
defined by Salt Lake City and has been construed by
the Courts.

The bulk of Aggie's revenue comes from

his package sales. Food constitutes a small part of
his total business.
In addition, if there was any doubt as to
what the term "public restaurant" means, the court
should have considered the construction placed upon
the term by the parties themselves.

When Appellants

operated the restaurant, they provided a variety of
entrees and the salad bar to members.

Nikols entered

in to provide excellent food and service to Athletic
Club members, and he continued this operation when he
opened to the public.

That is the best evidence of

what the parties contemplated when they used the term
"public restaurant".

Aggie's operation differs sub-

stantially from prior operation by Appellants and Nikols.
Under the Sublease, Nikols was permitted to
offer additional service, but he was not permitted to
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-19either change the operation or curtail it.
was clear as to Aggie's operation.

The evidence

Respondents pre-

sented no contradictory evidence except their own selfserving statements, which were contradicted by Aggie's own
business records.
Aggie's operation clearly fails to meet the
standards of a restaurant for liquor and zoning purposes,
and it does not meet the criteria established by other
courts which have construed similar liquor and zoning
laws.

The trial court should have found as a matter of

law that Respondents were not operating the premises as
a public restaurant.
POINT III
v
—

THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING $613.01
TO RESPONDENTS FOR CHARGES MADE BY
MEMBERS OF THE SALT LAKE ATHLETIC CLUB.
The evidence was clear that there was no agree-

ment for Appellants to pay DAB for charges made by members
of the Athletic Club at Aggie's Club & Restaurant.
Aggie testified that Appellants never asked him to carry
any charges for him.

Aggie later testified that Appellants

refused to back up the charges by Athletic Club members
so that Aggie would extend them credit.

Aggie sent a

statement to Appellants for charges by Athletic Club members.
Appellant's bookkeeper acknowledged receipt of Aggie's bill
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she agreed the bill was owed or that she had authority

I
I

to so agree.

I

-20and went over it with him, but there is no evidence that

(See Statement of Facts 28 through 31).

There was no evidence that Appellants and DAB

Appellants' complaint and to award judgment to Appellants,

i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i

terminating Respondents' possession of the premises, to

I

ever reached any understanding

or agreement concerning

payment or guaranty of the charges.

On the contrary,

Aggie testified Appellants refused to guaranty charges
by members. Moreover, under no principle of contract
law could appellants be bound by an agreement or arrangement between Aggie and persons who are also members of
the Salt Lake Athletic Club.

The trial court erred in

awarding the amount of such charges to DAB.
CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully request this court to
reverse the trial court's decision with regard to

reverse the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to
Respondent Nikols and Respondents DAB, and to reverse the

I

trial court's award of $613.01 to Respondents DAB under

i

Count IV of their counterclaim.

Appellants also request

that this court assess damages against all Respondents for
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-21their unlawful detainer of the premises from and after
September 12, 1974, at the rate of $3,000 per month.
(R. 294).
DATED this 2^>

day of June, 1975.

Respectfully submitted,
JAMES A. ARROWSMITH
WATKINS & FABER
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiffs: Appellants
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of
Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief to Hardin A. Whitney and
Wayne G. Petty, Moyle & Draper, 600 Deseret Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for DefendantRespondent Nikols, and two copies to F. Alan Fletcher,
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 79 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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